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IS FAIR USE ACTUALLY FAIR? ANALYZING FAIR USE AND THE 
POTENTIAL FOR COMPULSORY LICENSING IN  
AUTHORS GUILD V. GOOGLE  
Varsha Mangal* 
As books are becoming electronic, people are now conducting 
more research online instead of venturing into bookstores and 
libraries. The number of bookstores in the nation is declining as 
people replace the relationship they once had with these stores with 
online sources. Particularly, in services such as Google Books, 
people use search engines to browse books in the same manner they 
would as if they were in a store. The lawsuit between Authors Guild 
and Google has been ongoing for over a decade, and the case 
largely turns on the question of fair use. However, fair use in certain 
situations fails by putting an undue burden on authors to help 
benefit the general public. Therefore, there needs to be an alternate 
legal avenue in place to address this problem. This Recent 
Development argues that, in light of preserving the access of 
information to the public, the law should be amended to allow for 
compulsory licensing so that information may be widely dispersed 
while being sensitive to the significant contributions of Google and 
the Authors Guild. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The decline of bookstores is frightening yet simultaneously 
liberating. It is fearsome because bookstores have been a long-
established means for consumers to browse and buy books. 
Countless individuals walk into bookstores, pick up a book, read 
excerpts of the text in varying proportion, and then perhaps decide 
to buy it. People often even sit down and read large portions of the 
                                                 
 * J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2017. The author 
would like to thank the NC JOLT staff and editors for their assistance with this 
Recent Development, particularly Collette Corser, Chelsea Weiermiller, Cameron 
Neal, and Charlotte Davis. The author would also like to thank Professors David 
Ardia and John Conley for their insights and mentoring. 
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text and ultimately decide against a purchase. This practice has been 
occurring perhaps for as long as bookstores have existed, and it has 
no apparent legal consequences. In fact, instead of dissuading 
consumers from reading snippets of books in a bookstore, Barnes & 
Noble employees find certain consumers, particularly youths seen 
reading in the children’s section, to be “[c]ute.”1 
It is liberating, however, because the decline of bookstores 
resulted in the increase of electronic purchases of books and e-
books.2 Access to books and information is greater and easier to 
obtain than ever before. While these two experiences may feel 
analogous to the consumer, these two processes affect authors 
differently, which poses a legal conundrum. 
For brick-and-mortar bookstores, there is no copyright violation 
if consumers read excerpts of a book for free that they do not intend 
to buy because the consumers are not encroaching on any of the 
rightsholder’s exclusive rights. Furthermore, the system works 
because the browsing consumer usually ultimately purchases a book 
and thus authors still receive compensation for their work. Although 
the process may be different for authors with varying degrees of 
fame 3  or depend on whether a business is a chain or a local 
bookstore, practically all bookstores aim to function in a manner that 
will generate revenue. In some instances, a bookstore will buy books 
                                                 
 1 See Sara Jonsson, 8 Types of People You’ll See at the Bookstore, BARNES & 
NOBLE (Oct. 9, 2013, 10:15 AM), http://www.barnesandnoble.com/blog/8-types-
of-people-youll-see-at-the-bookstore/. 
 2 See Max Nisen, These Charts Show Just How Bad Things Are For Bookstores, 
BUSINESS INSIDER (Oct. 15, 2013, 10:53 AM),  
http://www.businessinsider.com/why-bookstores-are-doomed-2013-10. This 
article provides graphs that show starting in 2008, there has been a decline in 
monthly retail sales at brick and mortar bookstores. Id. The graph shows that 
starting in 2008, there was a great increase in e-reader related searches on Google, 
specifically for the Kindle. Id. This spike in interest for e-readers corresponded 
precisely with the decline of sales in brick and mortar bookstores. Id. 
 3 As discussed in this Introduction, consignment situations are more likely to 
occur for local authors who are not very famous. However, bookstores may 
purchase the book in full from famous authors who write books that are in greater 
demand and more likely to sell. 
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outright.4 However, sometimes a purchase of the book is relatively 
risky, such as when local authors want to sell books to a small, local 
bookstore. In response, bookstores created an alternate system: 
consignment. In this process, the bookstore will pay the author once 
the book is sold, and the author generates only a certain percentage 
of the retail price of the book, the standard being 60%.5 
Consignments deal with high-risk scenarios, and authors only 
receive revenue when a consumer purchases a book.6 However, as 
technology has brought forth significant changes, the way the world 
browses and purchases books has also drastically changed. This 
Recent Development specifically examines the unique legal 
problems for book authors and copyright owners resulting from the 
rise of e-books and books purchased electronically. Although this 
paper will discuss the technology developed by Google in depth, 
Amazon and Barnes & Noble have also digitized books to be read 
instantaneously on a tablet, laptop, or cell phone.7 
Specifically, in Part II, this Recent Development examines 
Authors Guild v. Google8, a Second Circuit decision indicating the 
problems inherent in electronic books. Part III discusses the fair use 
analysis, the current circuit split, and argues that although Authors 
Guild was decided correctly, fair use adopts a winner-take-all 
system that does more harm to the plaintiffs than is just. Part IV 
explores compulsory licensing, a different legal avenue that has 
been used in copyright law, and its treatment both internationally 
and in America. Part V argues that compulsory licensing should be 
adopted to remedy the problems of fair use in Authors Guild v. 
                                                 
 4  Stephanie Chandler, How Authors Can Sell to Bookstores, Plus Free 
Consignment Agreement, AUTHORITY PUBLISHING (Dec. 12, 2012), 
http://authoritypublishing.com/book-marketing/how-authors-can-sell-to-booksto 
res-free-bookstore-consignment-agreement-for-authors/. 
 5 Id. 
 6 See id. 
 7 Amazon sells the Kindle, which allows people to read books electronically on 
a small tablet See Kindle Books, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/Kindle-
eBooks/b?ie=UTF8&node=154606011 (last visited Mar. 4, 2016); Barnes & 
Noble sells a similar device called the NOOK. See NOOK Books, BARNES & 
NOBLE, http://www.barnesandnoble.com/b/nook-books/_/N-8qa (last visited 
Mar. 4, 2016). 
 8 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied __ U.S. __ (2016)(No. 15-849). 
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Google. This solution strives to mold copyright law to adapt to 
current technology, specifically in proposing a solution that models 
the online copies and purchases of books to be analogous to an 
author selling a book at a bookstore as discussed above. For this is 
what is precisely occurring: people are not going to bookstores and 
libraries as often when searching for books, but instead people are 
using now-available online services. 9  Thus, the concept and the 
transaction are the same. Logically, the law that governs the two 
methods should account for this trend and attempt to provide the 
same benefits to retailers, authors, and consumers alike. 
II. AUTHORS GUILD V. GOOGLE—THE PROBLEMATIC FACTS 
CONCERNING THE BATTLE OF COPYRIGHT HOLDERS’ RIGHTS 
AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
In order to understand the legal issues concerning Authors Guild 
v. Google, it is important to understand the underlying facts. This 
section will discuss the background that led to the dispute and then 
discuss the current status and major arguments in the suit. 
A. Technicalities of the Google Library Project 
This Recent Development attempts to resolve issues from the 
long-litigated case, Authors Guild v. Google.10 The dispute revolved 
around Google’s Library Project, in which Google created digitized 
copies of millions of books.11 The project allowed the public to 
generate key word searches to extract specific information, without 
acquiring the authors’ permission or providing the authors with any 
royalties for their copyrighted works.12 
                                                 
 9 See Nisen, supra note 2. 
 10  Authors Guild, 804 F.3d at 211–12. Authors Guild sued Google on 
September 20, 2005, as a putative class action. This was then followed by several 
years of negotiations that were ultimately rejected by the district court in March 
22, 2011, “as unfair to the class members who relied on the named plaintiffs to 
represent their interests.” Id. In October 2011, Authors Guild filed a fourth 
amended class action complaint. Id. On November 14, 2013, the district court 
granted Google’s motion for summary judgment on the basis of fair use. On 
December 10, 2013, Authors Guild appealed. Id. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
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Google’s Library Project involved agreements in 2004 with the 
world’s major libraries. These libraries submitted books from their 
collections to Google, which then digitally scanned and converted 
the works to machine-readable text and subsequently created 
indexes for the collection of these texts. 13  Additionally, Google 
allowed these participating libraries to obtain digital copies of the 
books they submitted, but specified that the libraries shall not use 
the digital copies to violate copyright laws.14 So far, Google has 
scanned, converted, and indexed over 20 million books of all kinds, 
including fiction, non-fiction, and even rare books that are out of 
print.15 
As a direct result of the conversion and indexing, Google is able 
to provide a “snippet-search” function that allows anyone in the 
public to read “snippets” of text that they wish to search for free.16 
An illustration of the snippet-feature provided in the appendix of the 
case depicts the result found when a scholar searches the term “fair 
use” in Google:17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  
 
                                                 
 13 Id. at 208. 
 14 Id. at 207. 
 15 Id. at 208. The books in the collection consist of works that that are in the 
public domain as well as copyrighted works. In order to ensure and improve 
accuracy of it digitized books, Google keeps the original scanned image of each 
book. Id. 
 16 Id. at 207. 
 17 Id. at 230 (Appendix A). 
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As shown above, a limited portion of the text is available and 
the exact terms the scholar searched for is highlighted in yellow. The 
benefit is tremendous—this technology allows people to access 
information instantaneously that would “otherwise not be obtainable 
in lifetimes of searching.”18 It is also noteworthy that Google does 
not make any direct profit from this through advertising or a 
subsequent purchase by a consumer.19 However, the Library Project 
                                                 
 18 Id. at 209. 
 19 Id. (“No advertising is displayed to a user of the search function. Nor does 
Google receive payment by reason of the searcher’s use of Google’s link to 
purchase the book.”).   
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can nevertheless be viewed as inherently commercial20 because it 
prevents competitor search engines from achieving similar results 
and thus puts Google at a much greater market advantage.21 This 
market advantage exists because (1) Google can generate better 
search results than its competitors and (2) competitors have been 
deterred for over a decade from digitizing books for fear of 
copyright liability from the uncertain results of Authors Guild v. 
Google. 22  Consequently, Google has developed this project for 
several years while no competitor has undertaken a similar 
endeavor. The Google Library Project provides undeniable benefits, 
but at a cost to rightsholders. As a result, rightsholders brought suit 
against Google in Authors Guild v. Google. 
B. Authors Guild v. Google 
On October 16, 2015, the Second Circuit affirmed the U.S. 
District Court of the Southern District of New York’s decision that 
Google’s project involving digitally copying books did not 
constitute copyright infringement. 23  The Authors Guild appealed 
this decision on December 31, 2015, but on April 18, 2016, the 
Supreme Court denied certiorari.24 
While Google successfully argued that it should be entitled to 
continue its Library Project under the fair use exception in copyright 
law, several authors still believe Google’s actions constitute 
copyright infringement. Specifically, Jim Bouton,25 Betty Miles,26 
and Joseph Goulden, 27  who each own copyrights on works that 
                                                 
 20 Commercialism is a consideration in the first factor of the fair use analysis. 
See infra Part III. 
 21 Brief for Appellants at 6, Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202 (2d 
Cir. 2015) (No. 12-4829). 
 22 Benjamin J. Keele, Copyright and Research in Google Book Search, WM & 
MARY LAW SCHOOL SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY (2011), 
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1026&context=libpubs. 
 23 Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 24 Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 208 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied 
__ U.S. __ (2016) (No. 15-849). 
 25 JIM BOUTON, BALL FOUR (1970). 
 26 BETTY MILES, THE TROUBLE WITH THIRTEEN (1979). 
 27  JOSEPH GOULDEN, THE SUPERLAWYERS: THE SMALL AND POWERFUL 
WORLD OF THE GREAT WASHINGTON LAW FIRMS (1972). 
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Google included in the Library Project, and joined Authors Guild in 
a suit against Google for copyright infringement on behalf of 
themselves and authors who are similarly situated.28 
The reason the plaintiffs sued is simple—authors are concerned 
regarding the loss of present and future revenue, which in turn can 
harm the nation’s creative culture. Google commenced its project 
without the permission from the copyright holders for the works 
being utilized in the project.29 The Authors Guild expressed two 
major ways Google’s Library project causes the authors economic 
harm: (1) it creates a disincentive for researchers to go out and buy 
books if they can find the material they need on Google Books, and 
(2) the slippery slope argument which suggests that if Google’s use 
is considered fair use, then anyone can claim fair use in digitizing 
books, which will inevitably lead to “widespread, free, and 
unrestricted availability of books online.”30 Thus, the Authors Guild 
claimed that Google poses a “serious threat to writers and their 
livelihoods, one which will affect the depth, resilience, and vitality 
of our intellectual culture.” 31  However, the Authors Guild 
emphasized that it believes that Google Books is “a good 
thing . . . .”32 These authors simply want a system where authors can 
still be compensated.33 
The holding of Authors Guild v. Google rested on the fair use 
defense. Although Google clearly used copyrighted works to 
provide its snippet-search function, Google’s use of the copyrighted 
material is fair use, and thus, Google does not have to pay the 
Authors Guild a dime. Had Google’s use been considered to not be 
fair use, then Google would have been held liable for infringing over 
20 million books and paid the respective damages, and the project 
would have continued without consent and licenses for each 
copyrighted book. Thus, had Google lost, not only does the 
company incur serious economic harm, but also the public would no 
                                                 
 28 See Authors Guild, 804 F.3d at 208. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Where We Stand, THE AUTHORS GUILD, https://www.authorsguild.org/ 
where-we-stand/authors-guild-v-google/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2016). 
 31 Id. 
    32 Id.  
 33 Id. 
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longer have the wonderful resource that the snippet function 
provides.  
In this case, Google in essence asked for forgiveness through fair 
use, since it had failed to appropriately ask for permission at the 
outset. In light of the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari, it is now 
final that forgiveness has been granted. However, the Supreme 
Court in its denial missed an opportunity to hear the case and resolve 
the inconsistency of the application of the fair use seen lower courts. 
Thus, this Recent Development will analyze the fair use defense in 
the next section in light of the varying analyzes seen in different 
circuits, and help readers understand the underlying consequences 
of granting Google fair use. 
III. THE MOST TROUBLESOME DOCTRINE IN COPYRIGHT LAW: 
FAIR USE 
The decisions in Authors Guild v. Google ultimately turned on 
whether Google’s actions qualified as a specific defense, fair use, to 
the author’s copyright protections. In 1984, the Supreme Court 
decided Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,34 and 
acknowledged that “[t]he doctrine of fair use has been called, with 
some justification, ‘the most troublesome in the whole law of 
copyright.’”35 The passage of time has not made fair use any less 
troublesome. The root of this trouble is that Congress did not 
“provide definitive rules when it codified the fair use doctrine in the 
1976 [Copyright] Act; it simply incorporated a list of factors ‘to be 
considered’”36 As a result, different circuits have begun to analyze 
the factors slightly differently. Part A will discuss the fair use four 
factor test and circuit split, and Part B will apply the rules to Authors 
Guild while taking a careful look at the analysis provided by the 
Second Circuit’s Court of Appeal decision. This analysis ultimately 
determines that although the Second Circuit correctly found for fair 
                                                 
34 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
 35 Id. at 475 (quoting Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d 
Cir. 1939); see also Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, 
Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1174 (5th Cir. 1980); Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 
1068 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978). 
 36 Sony, 464 U.S. at 476. 
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use, the doctrine of fair use fails in this situation because it unjustly 
place a significant burden on one party to provide a public benefit. 
A. The Circuit Split 
The four fair use factors, as set forth by the statute, are: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is 
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work.37 
At its core, the fair use defense is exactly how it sounds—it is 
grounded in the notion of fairness. Fair use is “troublesome” 
because courts do not sum the factors to determine whether 
something is fair use.38 Rather, courts perform a nuanced analysis 
balancing the benefit to the public with the harm to the creators.39 
When benefit to the public outweighs the harm the creators would 
face, courts find fair use.40 However, the statute does not tell us 
which factor is more important in the analysis and whether there 
should be placed more emphasis on the public interest or the 
creators.41 As a result, courts have valued the four factors of the test 
                                                 
 37 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
 38 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577–78 (1994). The 
court held:  
The task is not to be simplified with bright-line rules, for the statute, like 
the doctrine it recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis. The text 
employs the terms ‘including’ and ‘such as’ in the preamble paragraph 
to indicate the ‘illustrative and not limitative’ function of the examples 
given which thus provide only general guidance about the sorts of 
copying that courts and Congress most commonly had found to be fair 
uses. Nor may the four statutory factors be treated in isolation, one from 
another. All are to be explored, and the results weighed together, in light 
of the purposes of copyright.  
Id. (citations omitted). 
 39 See id. 
 40 See id. 
 41 See 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 251, 261 
Is Fair Use Actually Fair?  
differently, and there is a clear split between the Second and Seventh 
Circuits in the weighing of these factors.42 
The Second Circuit considers the first factor most important,43 
but the Seventh Circuit places greater emphasis on the fourth 
factor.44 Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC45 and Cariou v. Prince,46 
cases involving appropriation art, clearly demonstrates the split.47 In 
Kienitz, the Seventh Circuit case involved Micheal Kienitz, a 
photographer, who brought suit against Sconnie Nation for 
producing t-shirts and tank tops displaying an image of the Mayor 
of Madison, Wisconsin’s face (as shown below).48 Sconnie Nation 
conceded that it had used Kientz’s photograph as the basis of its 
work.49 
Figure 2:  
                                                 
 42 Besides the Second and Seventh circuits, other circuits have not appeared to 
take a direct stance in balancing the first and fourth factors. The Ninth Circuit 
recently stated “that factor one and factor four have ‘dominated the case law’ and 
are generally viewed as the most important factors.” Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 
725 F.3d 1170, 1179 (9th Cir. 2013). The Ninth Circuit previously acknowledged 
that “[a] transformative work is less likely to have an adverse impact on the market 
of the original than a work that merely supersedes the copyrighted work.” Kelly 
v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 821 (9th Cir. 2003). The Eleventh Circuit also 
did not explicitly determine which factor is more important but recognized the 
tension between the first and fourth factor in a case where it found that the fourth 
factor weighed strongly against fair use and the first factor weighed only slightly 
in favor of fair use. “Therefore, the District Court should have afforded the fourth 
fair use factor more significant weight in its overall fair use analysis.” Cambridge 
Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1283 (11th Cir. 2014). 
 43 Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 705 (2d Cir. 2013) (“The first statutory factor 
. . . is ‘[t]he heart of the fair use inquiry.’”). 
 44 Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014) (“We think 
it best to stick with the statutory list, of which the most important usually is the 
fourth (market effect).”). 
 45 766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 46 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 47  Appropriation art is an art form, seen within pop art, involving “the 
intentional borrowing, copying, and alteration of preexisting images and 
objects.” Pop Art, MOMA https://www.moma.org/learn/moma_learning/ 
themes/pop-art/appropriation (last visited Mar. 4, 2016). 
 48 Kienitz, 766 F.3d at 757. 
 49 Id. 
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50 
Giving the fourth factor the most importance, the Seventh 
Circuit first analyzed the market effect and found that it weighed in 
favor of fair use because the clothing did not act as a substitute for 
the demand of the original photograph, there was no disruption of a 
licensing plan, and the demand for the original work had not been 
reduced.51 Also relying heavily on factor three, which analyzes the 
amount and substantiality of the original work used, the Seventh 
Circuit found that so little of the original copyright remained that 
this factor also weighed in favor of fair use.52 Finally, the court gave 
little treatment to factors one and two, stating that they “don’t do 
                                                 
 50 Picture provided from the court opinion. Id. 
 51 Id. at 759. 
 52 Id. 
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much in this case.” 53  Thus, the court held that these actions 
constituted fair use and ruled in favor of Sconnie nation.54 
Similarly, in Cariou, the Second Circuit dealt with a copyright 
infringement suit brought by Cariou, a professional photographer, 
against Prince, a well-known appropriation artist, over photographs 
in Cariou’s book, Yes Rasta. 55  Prince had created a series of 
artworks, under the title Canal Zone, which utilized several torn out 
pages of Yes Rasta.56 Prince significantly altered the photographs in 
various ways, including painting “lozenges” over their subjects’ 
facial features and using only portions of some of the images.57 
Of the thirty works examined by the court, twenty-five of 
Prince’s artworks were found to be transformative under the first 
factor because they “have a different character, give Cariou’s 
photographs a new expression, and employ new aesthetics with 
                                                 
 53 Id. The court stated:  
Consider (1), for example. Defendants sold their products in the hope of 
profit, and made a small one, but they chose the design as a form of 
political commentary. Factor (2) is unilluminating, and as we have 
mentioned Kienitz does not argue that defendants’ acts have reduced the 
value of this photograph, which he licensed to Soglin at no royalty and 
which is posted on a public website for viewing and downloading 
without cost. 
Id. 
 54 Id. at 760. The Court ruled in favor of fair use but it seems that they would 
have easily ruled the other way had the plaintiffs made a stronger argument for 
economic loss. The court stated: 
[T]his use may injure Kienitz’s long-range commercial opportunities, 
even though it does not reduce the value he derives from this particular 
picture. He promises his subjects that the photos will be licensed only 
for dignified uses. Fewer people will hire or cooperate with Kienitz if 
they think that the high quality of his work will make the photos more 
effective when used against them. But Kienitz does not present an 
argument along these lines, and the consideration in the preceding 
paragraph is not enough to offset the fact that, by the time defendants 
were done, almost none of the copyrighted work remained. The district 
court thus reached the right conclusion. 
Id. at 759–60. 
 55 Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 699 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
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creative and communicative results distinct from Cariou’s.”58 Next, 
the Court jumped to the fourth factor where it posed a higher burden 
for market effect to weigh against fair use. Particularly, the Second 
Circuit found that the fourth factor “is not whether the secondary 
use suppresses or even destroys the market for the original work or 
its potential derivatives, but whether the secondary use usurps the 
market of the original work.”59 A secondary use usurps the original 
market, encompassing its derivative market, in instances “where the 
infringer’s target audience and the nature of the infringing content 
is the same as the original.”60 Because Prince’s work targeted a 
different audience than Cariou’s, the fourth factor also weighed in 
favor of fair use.61 
Next, the Second Circuit found that the second factor weighed 
against fair use because the works in dispute were creative, but 
nevertheless found that this factor was of “limited usefulness” 
because “the creative work of art is being used for a transformative 
purpose.” 62  Lastly, in analyzing factor three, Court found that 
although “Prince used key portions of certain of Cariou’s 
photographs . . . . Prince transformed those [twenty-five] 
photographs into something new and different and, as a result, this 
factor weighs heavily in Prince’s favor.”63 This analysis suggests 
that if the infringing work is found to be transformative under the 
first factor, the first factor overshadows the importance of the 
second and third factor. Consequently, the Second Circuit found all 
but five artworks to be fair use.64 The remaining five were remanded 
to the trial court because “[e]ach of those artworks differs from, but 
is still similar in key aesthetic ways, to Cariou’s photographs.”65 
Despite the similarities of fact and the same holding, the two 
circuits weighed these factors very differently. The Seventh Circuit 
directly addressed Cariou, particularly criticizing the Second 
                                                 
 58 Id. at 707–08. 
 59 Id. at 708. 
 60 Id. at 709. 
 61 See id. 
 62 Id. at 710. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. at 712. 
 65 Id. at 711. 
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Circuit’s application of the test, stating that the Second Circuit failed 
to “explain how every ‘transformative use’ can be ‘fair use’ without 
extinguishing the author’s rights” to derivative works.66 Although 
these cases deal with appropriation art, which is admittedly different 
from digitized books, the underlying law is the same. The decisions 
did not differ in interpreting whether appropriation is fair use, but 
differed in how to balance the factors of fair use, and particularly, 
the appropriate way to resolve the tension between the first and 
fourth factors. Considering the circuit split, the fair use analysis will 
be applied to Authors Guild v. Google in the next section. 
B.  Fair Use Applied to Authors Guild v. Google 
The Supreme Court has not decided a fair use case since the 
Campbell decision in 1994.67 Given the Supreme Court’s denial of 
certiorari, this case illustrates the need to resolve ongoing conflict in 
determining how to weigh the first factor emphasizing the 
transformative use against the fourth factor that focuses on market 
effects. In theory, these two factors should be two sides of the same 
coin because a highly transformative use should not cause market 
harm.68 This accounts for why Cariou and Kientz came out the same 
way. However, emphasizing different factors can potentially cause 
the same facts to yield a different result, as may very well be the 
case in Authors Guild v. Google. Because a goal of copyright law is 
to ensure the free flow of information to the public, this case was 
ultimately determined correctly on the grounds of fair use. Thus, the 
correct application of this defense makes it even more important to 
realize the shortcomings of fair use and the injustice faced by the 
Authors Guild. 
                                                 
 66 Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 67 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). Campbell is a case 
involving Acuff-Rose Music (Plaintiff) suing members of a rap music group, 2 
Live Crew, and their record company for producing the rap song, “Pretty Woman” 
that parodied Plaintiff’s rock-ballad “Oh, Pretty Woman.” Although Authors 
Guild does not deal with parodies, Campbell is still a valuable reference in 
interpreting the application of fair use, as the most recent Supreme Court case on 
fair use. Id.  
 68 Id. at 591. 
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1. Transformative Use: The Purpose and Character of the Use 
The first statutory factor, “the purpose and character of the use, 
including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for 
nonprofit educational purposes,” 69  is especially important in the 
circuit split. The Supreme Court in Campbell determined whether 
the use is transformative, considering whether the use “adds 
something new, with a further purpose or different character, 
altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message.”70 In 
determining whether the use is transformative, the “commercial or 
nonprofit character” of the use is also considered but is not 
conclusive. 71  Commercialism is considered to prevent a 
presumptively “unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that 
belongs to the owner of the copyright.”72 
The Second Circuit heavily weighs this first factor because it 
“communicates something new and different from the original or 
expands its utility, thus serving copyright’s overall objective of 
contributing to public knowledge.” 73  Google has argued that it 
satisfied transformative use because copying the texts provides the 
public with information that was otherwise unavailable. 74  The 
Second Circuit ultimately found transformative use because “the 
result of a word search is different in purpose, character, expression, 
meaning, and message from the page (and the book) from which it 
is drawn.”75 
Additionally, the Authors Guild asserted that the immense 
financial benefits demonstrate commercial use, a consideration used 
                                                 
 69 17 U.S.C § 107 (2012). 
 70 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. 
 71 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448–49 
(1984) (involving fair use in the context of personal use, involving defendants 
who manufactured and sold home video tape recorders). In this case, the Supreme 
Court stated that if the technology was being used “to make copies for a 
commercial or profit-making purpose, such use would presumptively be unfair.” 
Id. at 449. 
 72 Id. at 451. 
 73 Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 208 (2d Cir. 2015), petition for 
cert. filed, 84 U.S.L.W. 3357 (U.S. Dec. 31, 2015) (No. 15-849).  
 74 Id. at 215. 
 75 Id. at 217. 
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to weigh against a finding of transformative use.76 However, the 
Second Circuit dismissed this argument because “the more 
transformative the secondary work, the less will be the significance 
of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a 
finding of fair use.”77 Furthermore, commercial use must not be 
given presumptive weight because it would “swallow” uses that are 
considered otherwise classic examples of fair use, such as news 
reporting, in which selling newspapers for profit does not overcome 
the new industry’s ability to claim fair use.78 
This first factor is important in the fair use analysis because it 
focuses on the public interest. Here, the use is considered 
“transformed” because it is now accessible to the public to search in 
a new way. This is a broad interpretation of transformation since the 
inherent nature and value of the books are not being changed, but 
rather, the format is simply being enhanced. However, since the 
public benefit from access to more texts is so great, and because 
Google has no direct commercial gains from this project, it was 
reasonable for the Second Circuit to weigh this factor strongly in 
favor of fair use in light of the ultimate goals of copyright law. 
2. The Nature of the Copyrighted Work 
Although the Second Circuit chose not to weigh this factor 
heavily,79 it ultimately would not have affected the outcome in this 
case because the majority of the works were nonfictional. This 
factor asks whether the work is a creative work, which receives more 
protection, or if is more informational and functional in nature, 
                                                 
 76 Reply Brief for Plantiffs-Appellants at 5, Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 
F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015) (No. 12-4829), 2012 WL 5817270. 
 77 Authors Guild, 804 F.3d at 219 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 
510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994)). 
   78 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994). “If, 
indeed, commerciality carried presumptive force against a finding of fairness, 
the presumption would swallow nearly all of the illustrative uses listed in the 
preamble paragraph of § 107, including news reporting, comment, criticism, 
teaching, scholarship, and research, since these activities ‘are generally 
conducted for profit in this country.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 79 See Authors Guild, 804 F.3d at 220. 
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which will receive less protection.80 Creative works receive greater 
protection because they are the “core” of what copyright law is 
designed to protect.81 
The court found that the specific works of the three plaintiffs in 
this case were factual, non-creative pieces, 82  even though the 
plaintiffs hoped to represent all of the authors whose books have 
been digitized, which included the “hundreds of thousands, if not 
millions, of works of fiction.”83 Nevertheless, plaintiffs argued that 
the nonfiction authors may face even greater economic harm 
because those “works are often consulted in searches for relatively 
narrow types of information that can be found readily by reviewing 
small portions of a work without ever accessing the full text.”84 
Because the court gave little weight to this factor, it noted that the 
outcome would be the same even if the plaintiffs’ works were 
fiction.85 
Even if the court gave more weight to this factor, it would not 
have helped the Authors Guild win this case. The majority of the 
works that Google scanned without permission are nonfictional. 
However, the plaintiffs claimed that “hundreds of thousands, if not 
millions” 86  of fictional works were infringed as well. However, 
factor two and factor one are similar in that the rules appear to be 
closely intertwined with allowing uses that most greatly benefit the 
public interest. The public should be able to gain access to factual 
materials to increase people’s ability to learn and build upon ideas 
in such a process that fosters innovation. Although these non-
fictional works may have been infringed, the court should not 
disregard the factor test as it is traditionally applied. However, in 
applying the fair use test, fictional and non-fictional works were 
                                                 
 80  ROBERT E. TRAGER, ET AL., THE LAW OF JOURNALISM AND MASS 
COMMUNICATION, 606 (Matthew Byrnie et al. eds., 4th ed. 2013). 
 81 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994). 
 82 Authors Guild, 804 F.3d at 220. 
 83 Reply Brief for Plantiffs-Appellants at 6–7, Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 
804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015) (No. 12-4829), 2014 WL 3795603. 
 84 Id. at 7. 
 85 Authors Guild, 804 F.3d at 220. 
 86 Reply Brief for Plantiffs-Appellants at 6, Authors Guild, 804 F.3d 202 (No. 
12-4829), 2014 WL 3795603. 
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unfairly grouped together and this result poses serious harm to the 
creative community. Therefore, this Recent Development argues if 
the legislature adopted a compulsory licensing scheme, the law 
would be more flexible to accommodate fees arranged based on a 
tiered system or an algorithm accounting for the type of work to 
correct this injustice. 
3. The Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used in Relation 
to the Copyrighted Work as a Whole 
In analyzing the third factor, the statute directs courts to consider 
“the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole.”87 If the portion of the text used is 
small or unimportant, the court is more likely to decide this 
constitutes fair use than if large or vital parts of the text were used.88 
Here, the decision came down to numbers. The plaintiffs 
asserted that “[u]nder Google’s scheme, a full 78% of any given 
work is susceptible to display.”89 However, Google convinced the 
court that only 16% is actually revealed when a person conducts a 
search. 90  The court reasoned that although 78% is “theoretically 
accessible,” it is not in fact accessible because of other restrictions 
built into the program.91 The court also noted that the manner in 
which the content is revealed is just as important as the quantity. 
Here, the court found that Google’s search reveals content in a 
“fragmentary and scattered nature,” but if the search revealed 
content coherently, the court’s question and decision would have 
changed. Consequently, the court ruled in Google’s favor for this 
factor because consumers are unable to experience the true value of 
the book through the disjointed and fragmented nature provided 
through the snippet function.92 
The court noted that, “[e]ven if the search function revealed 
100% of the words of the copyrighted book, this would be of little 
                                                 
 87 17 U.S.C § 107 (2012). 
 88 Authors Guild, 804 F.3d. at 221. 
 89 Reply Brief for Plantiffs-Appellants at 19, Authors Guild, 804 F.3d 202 (No. 
12-4829), 2014 WL 3795603. 
 90 Authors Guild, 804 F.3d at 223. 
 91 Id. at 222 (emphasis in original). 
 92 Id. at 223. 
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substitutive value if the words were revealed in alphabetical order, 
or any order other than the order they follow in the original book.”93 
Thus, the court clearly saw more value in order and coherence rather 
than the quantity of the work. This further suggests that even if the 
court adopted the plaintiffs’ 78% number, the court still would have 
weighed this factor in favor of Google on the basis on coherence. 
However, this ruling has concerning consequences. If a person 
had access to the complete, but scrambled text, that person could 
still put words and phrases together like pieces of a puzzle. In this 
sense, the third factor is deeply connected the fourth factor. If one is 
given enough time to piece the text together, the snippet function 
could serve as a market substitute for the original copy of the text. 
The Seventh Circuit in Kientz placed great importance on factor 
three after discussing factor four, as these two factors are sometimes 
inextricably connected. If the Seventh Circuit had decided this 
factor, the result likely could have come out the other way. 
4. The Effect of the Use Upon the Potential Market for or Value 
of the Copyrighted Work 
The fourth and final factor of the statute, “the effect of use upon 
the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work,” 94 
considers “not only the extent of market harm caused by the 
particular actions of the alleged infringer, but also whether 
unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the 
defendant would result in a substantially adverse impact on the 
potential market for the original.”95 Thus, in the proper application 
of fair use, none of the allowed uses would “materially impair the 
marketability” of the original work.96 In Sony, the Supreme Court 
stressed that it need be only potential harm because it is speculative 
that actual proof is possible to obtain, but also that there is a serious 
danger in “confining the scope of an author’s rights on the basis of 
                                                 
 93 Id. 
 94 17 U.S.C § 107 (2012). 
 95 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 96 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 566–67 
(1985). 
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the present technology so that, as the years go by, his copyright loses 
much of its value because of unforeseen technical advances.”97 
In Authors Guild v. Google, the Second Circuit specifically 
asked whether the copy serves as “a competing substitute for the 
original” which can “deprive the rightsholder of significant revenues 
because of the likelihood that potential purchasers may opt to 
acquire the copy in preference to the original.”98 The Authors Guild 
argued that consumers do not always intend to read books cover-to-
cover, and, particularly for non-fiction works, just as often consult 
books for only a specific piece of information.99 Thus, the “heart”100 
of a book should not be found by an objective standard, but rather 
subjectively “by the very information sought by the user.” 101 
Nonetheless, the court held that Google’s snippet-search function is 
not sufficient to serve as a substitute for consumer’s need for the 
book that is being searched.102 
Despite this holding, the court recognized “that the snippet 
function can cause some loss of sales,” but was not convinced that 
there was a meaningful or significant effect “upon the potential 
market for or value of the copyrighted work.”103 Furthermore, the 
court reasoned the snippet function provides a “cumbersome, 
disjointed, and incomplete nature” of the book that will rarely satisfy 
“searcher’s interest in the protected aspect of the author’s work.”104 
However, the plaintiffs asserted, and the court did not address, that 
loss should also be viewed on a macro-scale, because there was 
strong “competitive landscape and immense commercial value” for 
                                                 
 97 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 482 (1984) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 98 Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 208 (2d Cir. 2015), petition for 
cert. filed, 84 U.S.L.W. 3357 (U.S. Dec. 31, 2015) (No. 15-849).  
 99 Reply Brief for Plantiffs-Appellants at 16–17, Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 
804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015) (No. 12-4829), 2014 WL 3795603. 
 100 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 471 U.S. at 565 (1985). The “heart” of a 
text are the text’s “most powerful passages” in all of its chapters, that “carry the 
definitive quality of the original,” and “qualitatively embodied . . . [the author’s] 
distinctive expression.” Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 101 Id. at 22. 
 102 Authors Guild, 804 F.3d at 223. 
 103 Id. at 224 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2012)). 
 104 Id. at 224–25. 
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an online database of copyright-protected books.105 As a result of 
this decision, others who would have potentially licensed and paid 
for the right to use a copyrighted work can now proceed to do so 
without a license, “forever precluding authors from realizing a new 
revenue stream while further entrenching Google’s monopoly.”106 
Although this factor may weigh slightly in Google’s favor based on 
lack of evidence, the plaintiffs’ argument is fairly compelling. 
While the Second Circuit did not address the plaintiffs’ macro-
scale argument, the Seventh Circuit may have analyzed it and 
considered it with great importance. As the Seventh Circuit stated, 
“[w]e think it best to stick with the statutory list, of which the most 
important usually is the fourth (market effect).”107 Thus, under the 
Seventh Circuit precedent, a reviewing court would have taken a 
deeper look at the economic effects on the copyrighted authors and 
if the court found significant market harm, the court might have held 
against fair use. This is especially true if the court viewed the first 
factor through the lens of the fourth factor. Since transformative 
uses theoretically do not generate considerable market harm, a 
finding of such harm would weigh against the notion that the use is 
transformative in the first place. Therefore, although the Seventh 
Circuit in Kienitz found for fair use, it may have found this argument 
persuasive enough to rule in favor of the Authors Guild. 
5.  Over-Arching Concerns in the Application of Fair Use 
Overall, the Second Circuit got it right. In resolving the tension 
between the first and fourth factor in this case, the benefit to the 
public clearly outweighs countervailing concerns. However, one is 
left with a lingering sense of injustice for the Authors Guild. The 
writers are forced to take on the economic burden of serving the 
public interest, even though they are not necessarily in the best place 
to do so. The burden for the public good is placed on “the little guy.” 
This, in turn, limits their resources and ability to produce even more 
                                                 
 105 See Brief for Appellants at 12, Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202 
(2d Cir. 2015) No. 12-4829, https://www.authorsguild.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2014/10/2014-Jul-24-AGvGoogle-AG-Reply-Brief.pdf. 
 106 Id. at 13. 
 107 Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014). 
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creative and scholarly works in the future, which undermines the 
ultimate goal of copyright law.108 
Some might question the soundness of the four-factor fair use 
analysis, which has been deemed the “most trouble-some in the 
whole law of copyright”109 because courts seem to apply the doctrine 
on a case-by-case basis. 110  Here, the Second Circuit based its 
decision on the notion that fair use was designed to serve the public 
good, and that Google’s service serves the public good by providing 
digitized information that greatly aids research and the flow of 
information. However, notable counterarguments include the 
significant economic impact on the creative community and the 
long-term harm that results from granting Google a “de facto 
monopoly.”111 
As a result, the court was forced to pick between two evils—
preventing public access to information now or preventing access in 
the future. Ruling against the Authors Guild posed a real harm to 
many in the writing industry, which may nonetheless harm the 
public in the future. Conversely, ruling against Google would have 
imposed an immediate harm to the public’s ability to access 
information and further society’s pursuit of knowledge. Fair use acts 
as an “on/off” switch, which forces one party to be a winner and the 
other party to be a loser. However, as fair use is applied to benefit 
the public, sometimes the burden on the losing party is simply too 
great. Therefore, a different legal avenue ought to be pursued. 
                                                 
 108 Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 208 (2d Cir. 2015), petition for 
cert. filed, 84 U.S.L.W. 3357 (U.S. Dec. 31, 2015) (No. 15-849) (“The ultimate 
goal of copyright is to expand public knowledge and understanding, which 
copyright seeks to achieve by giving potential creators exclusive control over 
copying of their works, thus giving them a financial incentive to create 
informative, intellectually enriching works for public consumption . . . . Thus, 
while authors are undoubtedly important intended beneficiaries of copyright, the 
ultimate, primary intended beneficiary is the public, whose access to knowledge 
copyright seeks to advance by providing rewards for authorship.”).  
   109 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 475 (1984) 
(quoting Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939). 
 110 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994). 
 111 Where We Stand, THE AUTHORS GUILD (Last Visited Jan. 29, 2016) (citing 
Judge Denny Chin). https://www.authorsguild.org/where-we-stand/authors-
guild-v-google/. 
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IV. AN ALTERNATE SOLUTION: COMPULSORY LICENSING 
Two fundamental concepts underlying copyright law are 
incentivizing people to produce creative works112 and promoting the 
public’s access to creative works.113 The Authors Guild v. Google 
verdict falls short on both accounts. Financial harm to the authors is 
clearly asserted by the Authors Guild in the form of lost future 
revenues that would have resulted from future licenses. The harm to 
the public is more obscure. On the surface, there seems to be a strong 
benefit to the public because people can now access a greater wealth 
of information online for free. However, this law also helps Google 
maintain a monopoly on digitized content, and a lack of competition 
between companies can often adversely affect the public. As fair use 
provides an imperfect solution, this Recent Development strives to 
set forth a more effective solution that does not necessarily harm the 
Authors Guild. 
One solution existing in intellectual property law, originating in 
patent law, but that has also been adopted by copyright law,114 is 
compulsory licensing. A compulsory license, sometimes referred to 
as a statutory license, is a remedy that allows access to copyrighted 
works or other intellectual property without permission of or against 
the wishes of the intellectual property right holder.115 Specifically 
pertaining to copyrights, a compulsory license is an unwritten 
contract that allows a user immediate access to copyrighted works 
without first obtaining permission from the copyright owner. The 
user then retroactively pays a fee to the copyright holder.116 In this 
scheme, the license must be granted to the class of users if they 
                                                 
 112 “The purpose of copyright is to create incentives for creative effort.” Sony 
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 450 (1984). 
 113 The monopoly created by copyright thus rewards the individual author in 
order to benefit the public. Id. at 477. 
 114 Carolos M. Correa, Intellectual Property Rights and the Use of Compulsory 
Licenses: Options for Developing Countries, TRADE-RELATED AGENDA, 
DEVELOPMENT AND EQUITY WORKING PAPERS 3 (1999), 
http://www.iatp.org/files/Intellectual_Property_Rights_and_the_Use_of_Co.pdf. 
 115 Jarrod Tudor, Compulsory Licensing in the European Union, 4 GEO. MASON 
J. INT’L COM. L. 222 (2013). 
 116 Yafit Lev-Aretz, The Subtle Incentive Theory of Copyright Licensing, 80 
BROOK. L. REV. 1357, 1376 (2015). 
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satisfy certain statutory requirements, and depending on the statute, 
the price mechanism is set in advance, as determined by Congress.117 
The demand for an efficient licensing systems has been “steadily 
present in copyright reality” between different creative markets.118 
Consumers recognize the indirect harm through the lack of licensing 
options that prevents access to various works of authorship that a 
licensing system could otherwise allow for, and the resultant 
proliferation of piracy.119 Content consumption has many benefits, 
allowing consumers to be exposed to greater social, cultural, and 
educational concepts as well as encouraging authors to create new 
content by drawing inspiration from pre-existing works. 
Particularly, compulsory licensing has previously been adopted in 
response to the emergence of new technology120 in order to promote 
efficiency and transfers, and access to work that would not 
otherwise be available under the pre-existing copyright scheme.121 
The major benefits of a compulsory license are efficiency and 
certainty.122 Compulsory licensing promotes efficiency in two ways: 
(1) pre-determined contractual stipulations that eliminate 
negotiation costs, and (2) built-in administrative support that 
“allows parties to economize on recordkeeping, royalty distribution, 
                                                 
 117 Id. 
 118  Such demand is present because there is currently a lack of licensing 
alternatives available in copyright law and this deficiency has generated a variety 
of concerns. Id. 
 119 See id. at 1373. 
 120 Id. at 1376. 
 121  Id. at 1378. “The rise of digital technology rendered existing licensing 
models unfit for the mass of creative users wishing to employ copyrighted 
materials, and thus, intervening in the market failure through compulsory 
licensing mechanisms seems adequate. By removing the difficulties involved in 
identifying and locating rightholders, bargaining over licensing fees, and 
transferring assets, compulsory licenses lessen transaction costs and allow many 
transfers that would not otherwise occur.” Id. 
 122 Id. at 1376–77. Furthermore, compulsory licensing has the ability to enhance 
“speech diversity” because it allows for people to use works in a way they would 
other fear constitute infringement. Id. at 1374. In particular, “[w]hen a compulsory 
licensing model is prescribed, Congress acknowledges that, for a specific use of 
a protected work, the conventional copyright allocation does not appropriately 
effectuate copyright social utility objectives.” Id. at 1376. 
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and payment charging.” 123  The rightsholder will likely benefit 
through sales and revenue. Although the rightsholder “might receive 
less compensation per use,” the rightsholder could nevertheless be 
much better off financially because of the total revenue generated 
from an increased number of license transfers. 124  From a policy 
perspective, compulsory licenses are desirable because they 
communicate the message that a “copyright has its price”125 and 
users are required to pay when accessing work that was generated 
by others. 
However, there are also legitimate concerns when contemplating 
compulsory licenses. While compulsory licensing offers certainty 
and efficiency, fair use offers flexibility. There is a concern that 
copyright owners may be forced by statute to act against their wishes 
in cases where they otherwise would have an exclusive right to 
decide how to release their works. 126  Others raise concerns that 
compulsory licensing’s “flat rate pricing schemes fail to 
differentiate between derivative uses varying in quantitative size and 
qualitative importance,”127 that the costs involved in maintaining an 
accurate tracking system could also prove expensive, and that if the 
tracking system fails, rightholders may end up underpaid.128 
Nevertheless, proponents of compulsory licensing find that it is 
successful in the intellectual property field,129 and see it as a tool to 
mitigate the impact of exclusive rights and thus facilitate the 
public’s ability to access information and creative works. 130 
Therefore, compulsory licensing can offer many benefits in 
digitized books, by allowing the authors the certainty that they will 
                                                 
 123 Id. at 1376–77. 
 124 Id. at 1378. 
 125 Id. at 1379. 
 126 Id. (A salient disadvantage to compulsory licensing is that “the government 
expropriates property rights without cause and interferes unduly with market 
mechanisms.”).  
 127 Id. at 1380. “The flat rate associated with compulsory licensing models also 
negates rightholders’ ability to participate in price discrimination--a practice that 
may augment social welfare by adding to the owner’s income and by allowing 
more people to engage in the market of creation.” Id. 
 128 Id. at 1381. 
 129 Id. at 1376. 
 130 See Correa, supra note 115, at 2. 
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be able to obtain royalties for their work, while still allowing for an 
efficient system and means for Google to create a digitized library 
to supplement their search engine. Thus, a compulsory license 
allows the public to search the copyrighted materials while still 
satisfying the basic needs of both parties. This Recent Development 
will first examine existing international and American laws, and 
then suggest how compulsory licensing can be specifically 
implemented in the case of Authors Guild v. Google to reform 
copyright law in the field of digitalized books. 
A.  International Compulsory Licensing and the Berne Convention 
International analysis of copyright law and compulsory 
licensing is noteworthy because American copyright law does not 
exist completely independently from other countries. International 
copyright law is connected to other countries through multilateral 
agreements like the Berne Convention.131 There are two articles in 
which the Berne Convention explicitly allows compulsory 
licensing: Broadcasting and Related Right 132  and Possible 
Limitation of the Right of Recording of Musical Works and Any 
Words Pertaining Thereto. 133  However, the Berne Convention 
specifically prohibits Compulsory Licensing for Cinematographic 
and Related Rights.134 
The Berne Convention refers to compulsory licensing for 
Broadcasting and Related Rights in its language: “It shall be a matter 
                                                 
 131 JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 
564 (Erwin Chemerinsky et. al. eds. 4th ed. 2015) (citing Dellar v. Samuel 
Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939)). The United States is a signatory 
to the Berne Convention. The purpose of joining the Berne Convention is “to 
ensure protection of its citizens’ creative works outside its own boundaries.” And 
thus, “[a]dherence to the Berne Convention will ensure strong, credible U.S. 
presence in the global marketplace and is also necessary to ensure effective U.S. 
participation in the formulation and management of international copyright 
policy.” Id. (quotations omitted).  
 132  Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 
opened for signature Sept. 9, 1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27, 
99th Cong. (1986) (revised at Paris, July 24, 1979) art. 11 [hereinafter Berne 
Conv.]. 
 133 Id. at art. 13. 
 134 Id. at art. 14. 
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for legislation in the countries of the Union to determine the 
conditions,”135 where the term “conditions” references compulsory 
licensing. 136  It provides an analogous statement for the Right of 
Recording and Musical Works.137 If a nation decides to implement a 
compulsory license, this language allows the nation to do so as long 
as it follows specific conditions. 
When the agreement was last amended in 1979, the drafters 
contemplated appropriate language for extant mediums, such as for 
broadcasting and musical works. 138  The rules for compulsory 
licenses for broadcasting were set forth as many governments 
demonstrated an interest in the medium “because of its powerful 
informatory, educational and entertainment role.”139 On the other 
hand, the language for musical works was inserted as a “pragmatic 
compromise that was already emerging at the national level between 
musical copyright owners (mainly publishers) and the newly 
emerging recording industry.”140 
                                                 
 135 Id. at art. 2. “It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union 
to determine the conditions under which the rights mentioned in the preceding 
paragraph may be exercised, but these conditions shall apply only in the countries 
where they have been prescribed. They shall not in any circumstances be 
prejudicial to the moral rights of the author, nor to his right to obtain equitable 
remuneration which, in the absence of agreement, shall be fixed by competent 
authority.” Id. 
 136 Sam Ricketson, WIPO Study on Limitations and Exceptions of Copyright 
and Related Rights in the Digital Environment, 31 (WIPO) (April 5, 2003) 
(hereinafter Ricketson, WIPO Study) (“The reference to ‘conditions’ in Article 
11bis(2) is usually taken to refer to the imposition of compulsory licenses, but the 
form of these licenses is left to national legislation to determine.”).  
 137 Berne Conv., supra note 133, art. 13 “Each country of the Union may impose 
for itself reservations and conditions on the exclusive right granted to the author 
of a musical work and to the author of any words, the recording of which together 
with the musical work has already been authorized by the latter, to authorize the 
sound recording of that musical work, together with such words, if any; but all 
such reservations and conditions shall apply only in the countries which have 
imposed them and shall not, in any circumstances, be prejudicial to the rights of 
these authors to obtain equitable remuneration which, in the absence of 
agreement, shall be fixed by competent authority.” Id.  
 138 Berne Conv., supra note 133, art. 11, 13. 
 139 Ricketson, WIPO Study, supra note 137, at 30. 
 140 Id. at 29. 
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The Berne Convention took place long before the development 
of the Google Library Project. Although it is impossible to know 
precisely what the drafters would think about digitized books, and 
the drafters did not discuss licensing of books in the main body of 
their text, they did discuss the potential for developing country book 
translation licensing in the Appendix of the Berne Convention.141 It 
provided that developing countries might choose to implement 
licensing systems for “printed or analogous forms of 
reproduction.”142 For developing countries, the Berne Convention 
wanted to implement a licensing scheme for written works as it was 
“principally concerned with such things as encyclopedias and 
anthologies, schoolbooks, manuals on physics, chemistry, 
engineering, space-exploration, etc., and not the latest song hit or 
the new London or Paris stage success.”143 Thus, although there is 
no specific licensing provision for written works as there is with 
music and broadcasting, the drafters of the Berne Convention would 
have allowed for flexible treatment for applying compulsory 
licensing to books. However, the drafters believed that compulsory 
licenses should be constructed in a way that was fair and just.144 
Thus, in the spirit of the Berne Convention, it appears that although 
compulsory licensing is certainly not the go-to for copyright 
                                                 
 141 Berne Conv., supra note 133, Appendix art. 2. 
 142 Id. 
 143 World Intellectual Property Organization, Guide to the Berne Convention 
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Publication no. 615(E), WIPO 
153 (1978). 
 144 The language of “equitable remuneration” and determining what would have 
been paid if there are no compulsory licenses in place can be seen as the drafters 
ensuring that any compulsory licenses adopted by countries should be fair and 
just. See Ricketson, WIPO Study, supra note 137 at 30. (“If a country imposes 
reservations and conditions under Article 13(1), these must not be ‘prejudicial to 
the rights of these authors to obtain equitable remuneration which, in the absence 
of agreement, shall be fixed by the competent authority.’ As noted above, this is 
normally taken to mean that the conditions and reservations which are imposed 
will take the form of compulsory licenses. Its effect is certainly to exclude 
provisions which enable the free recording of works, or to permit this for less than 
an equitable remuneration . . . the role of the competent authority is crucial, as it 
will have to make a notional judgment as to what amount would have been 
negotiated in the absence of a compulsory license.”(citing Berne Convention)). 
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legislation, it is acceptable to address specific problems that arise if 
drafted thoughtfully. 
As the Berne Convention is an international agreement, it is not 
indicative of country-specific compulsory licensing law. European 
courts have applied compulsory copyright licensing laws as seen for 
example in the Magill145 case. Decided in the European Court of 
Justice,146 Magill involved local television stations in Ireland that 
refused to license their program guides to Magill Company,147 which 
sought to publish a comprehensive television guide.148 The stations 
asserted their copyright protections, but the European Court of 
Justice upheld a compulsory copyright license that forced the 
stations to hand over their materials to Magill.149 In the analysis, the 
court found that the local television stations had a factual monopoly 
over the production and publication of their weekly listings because 
the “listings are a by-product of the programme scheduling process, 
carried out and known only to the programme planners 
themselves.”150 The court further acknowledged that “the listings 
only become marketable products when the schedules themselves 
                                                 
 145 Commission Decision 89/205/EEC of 21 December 1988, Case IV/31.851, 
Magill TV Guide/ITP, BBC and RTE, 1989 O.J. (L78) 43, 44, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31989D0205 
&qid=1454970750223&from=EN [hereinafter Magill Commission Decision]; 
see Joined Cases C-241/91 P & C-242/91 P, Radio Telefis Eireann,  Indep. 
Television Publ’ns Ltd v. Comm’n, 1995 E.C.R. I-743, 4 C.M.L.R. 718 (1995),, 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX: 
61991CJ0241&from=EN. 
 146 The European Court of Justice is comprised of one judge from each EU 
country and eleven advocates general. Court of Justice of the European Union, 
EUROPEAN UNION (last visited Mar. 4, 2016), http://eurpa.eu/about-
eu/institutions-bodies/court-justice/index_en.htm. 
 147 “Magill TV Guide Ltd, Dublin, was established in order to publish in Ireland 
and Northern Ireland a weekly magazine containing information on forthcoming 
television programmes available to television viewers in the area.” Magill 
Commission Decision, supra note 146 at 44.  
 148 Id. at 44. 
 149 ”Accordingly the only remedy possible in the present case is to require ITP, 
BBC and RTE to supply each other and third parties on request and on a non-
discriminatory basis with their individual advance weekly programme listings and 
to permit reproduction of those listings by such parties.” Id. at 50. 
150 Id. at 48. 
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are finalised (subject to last minute changes), a short time before 
transmission.”151 It is impossible for third parties to produce reliable 
listings without first obtaining the listings from the corresponding 
broadcasting organizations or the rights owners of the listing.152 As 
a result, third parties are economically dependent on the 
broadcasting organizations and rightsholders, who are in the 
dominant position. 153  The court reasoned “that an abuse is 
committed if an undertaking in a dominant position limits 
production or markets to the prejudice of consumers.”154 Here, the 
television stations committed abuse by limiting the scope of their 
licensing policies, which prevented production and sale of TV 
guides, which had an ultimate effect of restricting competition and 
prejudicing consumers.155 
Through this reasoning, the court mingles copyright and 
compulsory licensing with concepts of antitrust and fair 
competition.156 In Authors Guild, similar concerns have been raised 
that Google may have a de facto monopoly with its search engine’s 
ability to provide the snippet-function as a result of the decision. 
What can be gleaned from international and European laws is that 
copyright law should not be considered in a vacuum and that 
compulsory licensing can be an appropriate remedy when there are 
antitrust concerns resulting from copyright holder’s right to 
exclusive use. In the international sphere, the Berne Convention 
permits the use of compulsory licenses and other countries have 
embraced the notion to solve certain problems. Compulsory 
licensing has worked in other countries and the legal concept is 
accepted internationally as a useful remedy for certain copyright 
                                                 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. at 49. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Antitrust and fair competition largely fall outside the scope of this paper, 
however, there are US cases that deal with these issues. See United States v. Glaxo 
Group Ltd., 410 U.S. 52, 64 (1973) (“Mandatory selling on specified terms and 
compulsory patent licensing at reasonable charges are recognized antitrust 
remedies.”); United States v. Besser Mfg. Co., 343 U.S. 444, 447 (1952); United 
States v. General Electric Co., 115 F. Supp. 835, 843-46 (D.N.J. 1953). 
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issues. Though Magill is certainly not binding on the United States, 
it is a helpful illustration and provides a broader perspective when 
looking at American compulsory licensing law. 
B. American Law: Example of Compulsory Licensing under 
Section 115157  
Like European law, compulsory licensing is not a foreign 
concept in American law. Compulsory licensing in the United States 
dates back to the era of phonograph record players when musicians 
sold more than sheet music.158 When phonographs were novel, and 
thus not paying royalties, Congress amended the statute for 
copyright owners to control “mechanical reproduction” of their 
works.159 However, Congress was suspicious of the market power of 
the Aeolian Company, 160  which produced piano rolls, and thus 
enacted a compulsory licensing scheme for the first time. 
Codified under 17 U.S.C. § 115 for nondramatic musical works, 
making and distributing phonorecords is subject to compulsory 
licensing.161 The statute defines phonorecords as “material objects in 
which sounds, other than those accompanying a motion picture or 
other audiovisual work, are fixed.”162 Simply put, § 115 allows a 
person to distribute a new sound recording of a musical work, if that 
has been previously distributed to the public, by or under the 
                                                 
 157  See 17 U.S.C. §§ 115, 118, 111(c), 114(d) (2012). Instances where 
compulsory licensing included non-dramatic musical compositions, public 
broadcasting, retransmission by cable systems, subscription digital audio 
transmission, and non-subscription digital audio transmission such as Internet 
Radio. Id. 
 158 COHEN ET AL., supra note 132, at 413. 
 159 Id. 
 160 “The Aeolian Corporation was one of the largest and most successful piano 
companies in American History. Established in 1903, Aeolian originally built its 
empire on the new-found popularity of the player piano. Aeolian went on to be a 
leading builder of all types of pianos and organs in America and Europe, and most 
of their pianos during this time were of excellent quality.” Aeolian, ANTIQUE 
PIANO SHOP (last visited Mar. 4, 2016), http://antiquepianoshop.com/online-
museum/aeolian/; Aeolian Halls – A History of Concerts Inspired by the Pianola, 
PIANOLA INSTITUTE (last visited Mar. 4, 2016) 
http://www.pianola.org/factsheets/aeolianhalls.cfm. 
 161 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2012). 
 162 Id. § 101. 
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authority of the copyright owner. 163  Thus, this allows artists to 
record “covers” of musical works created by other artists.164 The new 
recording need not be identical to the previous work, as the 
compulsory license includes the privilege of rearranging the work to 
conform it to the recording artist’s interpretation.165 For example, in 
recording a cover of a song, the recording artist might chose to make 
stylistic alterations or change a word. Congress enacted § 115 
because by 1995 it had recognized that “digital transmission of 
sound recordings was likely to become a very important outlet for 
the performance of recorded music” and that “these new 
technologies also may lead to new systems for the electronic 
distribution of phonorecords with the authorization of the affected 
copyright owners.”166 
Furthermore, there remains some flexibility in the law as the 
compulsory license not mandatory but allows any creator and 
distributor of phonorecords to negotiate directly with the copyright 
holder.167 In the event the copyright owner cannot be reached, the 
recording artist can use the compulsory licensing provisions. 168 
However, if the recording artist does not pay the compulsory license 
to the copyright holder, then the recording artist has committed 
infringement. Despite these statutory provisions, the compulsory 
license is not the means by which creators typically obtain 
permission for musical works.169 Instead, it is more common for a 
creator to contract for a song through the Harry Fox Agency170 in 
                                                 
 163 See id. § 115. 
 164 COHEN ET AL., supra note 132, at 413. 
 165 Compulsory License for Making and Distributing Phonorecords, 
COPYRIGHT OFFICE 2, http://copyright.gov/circs/circ73.pdf. 
 166  Marybeth Peters, Section 115 Compulsory License, COPYRIGHT OFFICE 
(Mar. 11, 2004) http://www.copyright.gov/docs/regstat031104.html. 
 167 Compulsory License for Making and Distributing Phonorecords, supra note 
165. 
 168 Id. 
 169 COHEN ET AL., supra note 132, at 414. 
 170  What does HFA do? HFA (last visited Mar. 4, 2016), 
https://www.harryfox.com/publishers/what_does_hfa_do.html. The Harry Fox 
Agency (HFA) “is the leading provider of rights management, licensing, and 
royalty services for the U.S. music industry and was established in 1927 by the 
National Music Publishers’ Association (NMPA) as an agency to license, collect, 
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New York City through a music publisher or use of Songtrust.171 The 
statutory compulsory license does not affect the rates paid by the 
recording artist, but it is rare that the agreed license rate would 
exceed a rate that would otherwise be set by the Copyright Royalty 
Judges.172 
As seen through phonorecords, compulsory licensing has 
already been successfully adopted in America. The concepts and 
structure from this existing scheme provides a foundation that can 
be built upon and applied to a different creative medium under 
copyright law: electronic books. 
V. APPLYING COMPULSORY LICENSES TO BOOKS 
In what has been coined as the Google Book Search (“GBS”) 
settlement, Google and the Authors Guild independently created a 
scheme that resembles compulsory licensing.173 In fact, if the district 
court had approved the GBS settlement, it would have been 
“tantamount to legislative reform”174 because “Google was planning 
to make no effort to get actual consent from class members, who 
instead would have been deemed to have consented by virtue of their 
membership in a class whose counsel negotiated the settlement, 
supposedly on their behalf.” 175  Thus, compulsory licensing is 
especially fitting for this medium because it is a solution to which 
both parties have already agreed. 
                                                 
and distribute royalties on behalf of musical copyright owners. HFA issues 
mechanical licenses for products manufactured and distributed in the U.S. A 
mechanical license grants the rights to reproduce and distribute copyrighted 
musical compositions (songs) for use on CDs, records, tapes, ringtones, 
permanent digital downloads, interactive streams and other digital formats 
supporting various business models, including locker-based music services and 
bundled music offerings.” Id. 
 171 COHEN ET AL., supra note 132, at 414 (“Songwriters who have not contracted 
with a music publisher may utilize Songtrust, an entity that has arrangement with 
Harry Fox as well.”). 
 172 Id. 
 173 Pamela Samuelson, The Google Book Settlement As Copyright Reform, 2011 
WIS. L. REV. 479, 482–83 (2011) (“It would, in effect, give Google a compulsory 
license to commercialize millions of out-of-print books[.]”).  
 174 Id. at 515. 
 175 Id. 
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The current system of fair use may seem to offer flexibility by 
allowing courts to grapple with the fact-specific issues of each case. 
However, fair use functions as an “on/off switch.”176 In fair use 
cases, courts can find infringement and hold the defendant liable or 
find fair use. If court finds infringement, the third party may not be 
able to use the work at all if they are unable to receive consent from 
the author. However, if the court finds fair use, the copyright owner 
does not receive any compensation. Thus, the fair use system is rigid 
because it only allows for binary outcomes. In contrast, compulsory 
licensing allows for a middle ground where neither party is severely 
disadvantaged and the public retains its ability to access all the 
information. 
Compulsory licensing can be created separate from the world of 
fair use and softens fair use’s hard line by allowing for an 
alternative. The compulsory license should be narrowly tailored, 
similar to the law concerning producing and distributing 
phonorecords that embody a musical work that had been previously 
distributed to the public. 177  Thus, instead of not being able to 
reproduce an entire pre-existing song, a recording artist is able to 
perform that song as long as he pays the appropriate fee. If Congress 
were to adopt a similar compulsory license provision for 
phonorecords, it could also draft the statute narrowly tailored to 
digitized books. 
In contemplating how to draft such a provision, the GBS 
settlement drafted in October 2008 is a valuable resource. In the 
settlement, Google agreed to pay $125 million, $45 million of which 
would have gone to the rightsholders of copyrighted works that had 
been infringed and $34.5 million would have gone to a newly 
created Book Rights Registry, “an organization that would track 
down and distribute fees to authors.” 178  Furthermore, Google 
specified it would pay 63% “of all revenues earned by Google 
through uses of Books in Google Products and Services,” which 
                                                 
 176Jane C. Ginsburg, Fair Use for Free, or Permitted-but-Paid?, 29 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1383, 1383 (2014). 
 177 See COHEN ET AL., supra note 132, at 413. 
 178 Where We Stand, THE AUTHORS GUILD (Jan. 29, 2016), 
https://www.authorsguild.org/where-we-stand/authors-guild-v-google/. 
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would also be distributed by the Registry.179 In turn, Google would 
no longer be liable for copyright infringement.180 The settlement also 
benefitted the public by including more access to out-of-print books, 
additional ways to purchase copyrighted books, institutional 
subscriptions to millions of books online, and free access from 
American libraries.181 
Ultimately, the settlement was not approved in a hearing by 
Judge Chin, who ruled in March 2011 that the settlement was not 
“fair, reasonable, and adequate” to the class on whose behalf it was 
negotiated.182 As the settlement functioned largely as a compulsory 
license, it was not suitable for a judge to accept as a settlement.183 
However, this settlement is evidence that a compulsory license is a 
legal avenue both parties are willing to accept. 
Specifically, this settlement is proof that it is possible to propose 
a compulsory licensing scheme that can be beneficial to creators, an 
online vendor, and the public. If a compulsory license is to be 
adopted, it should not unduly burden either side and thus not harm 
either industry. Perhaps most importantly, the compulsory licensing 
scheme will ensure that the public will still have easy access to 
information that it will have under the current law where Google is 
granted fair use. 
A compulsory license benefits Google because it provides 
efficiency. Under this scheme, there is a presumption that Google 
can copy the work without worrying that an author will be difficult 
to find or refuse permission. Google would simply have to pay a fee. 
This is vital because Google was already investing a great deal of 
money in the project by scanning and indexing books and creating 
                                                 
 179 Amended Settlement Agreement at 24, The Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google 
Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) https://www.authorsguild.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/10/2009-Nov-13-AGvGoogle-Amended-Settlement-
Agreement.pdf. 
 180 Id. 
 181 Press Release, Authors Guild, Joint PUBLIC FAQ 1, 
https://www.authorsguild.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/Press-FAQs-10.28.08.pdf. 
 182 Samuelson, supra note 174, at 482. 
 183 See Samuelson, supra note 174, at 539 (stating “courts should engage in 
heightened scrutiny of the certifiability of a settlement class when the settlement 
would, in effect, achieve legislative outcomes”). 
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the snippet-feature. The company did not want to undergo the hassle 
of “seek[ing] advance permission, on a book-by-book basis, for 
every in-copyright book merely to serve snippets.”184 In addition to 
being too time-consuming, Google also believed it would “cost too 
much to allow an effective market to form.”185 Thus, if Google had 
lost the fair use claim, its project may have become impracticable 
and it would have had to drop the endeavor all together. 
A compulsory license also benefits the authors because it 
provides certainty. The authors receive guaranteed revenue, whereas 
the current law prohibits an author from obtaining any 
compensation. In the current scheme, the authors do not collect any 
compensation because Google is able to use their work for free 
under fair use. Thus, the compulsory license, at the very least, will 
ensure that the authors get some revenue. In drafting the compulsory 
license, Congress will need to be sensitive to market forces. There 
are different revenue systems that can be adopted. Although a flat 
rate is the simplest, it is not preferable because not all books are of 
equal value. There are different pricing scheme possibilities such as 
a tiered system, in which different categories of books receive 
different amounts of compensation, or, as seen in the Google Books 
settlement, a special algorithm can be created. As this issue arose 
with the advancement of technology, Congress should use likewise 
use technological advancements in resolving the problems inherent 
in digitized books. 
As Google is copying tens of thousands of books, author fees 
will quickly accumulate. Google claims it is not making any direct 
profit from the Library Project. 186  Imposing the fee will either 
require Google to find a way to generate money from this endeavor 
or force Google to decide to drop the project entirely. However, if 
Google drops the project, the public will have diminished access to 
information—a situation that copyright law is designed to avoid. 
Google has various options to generate revenue if it has to start 
paying the authors. Google can start adding advertisements to the 
                                                 
 184 Id. at 562, n. 176. 
 185 Id. 
 186 Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 208 (2d Cir. 2015), petition for 
cert. filed, 84 U.S.L.W. 3357 (U.S. Dec. 31, 2015) (No. 15-849).  
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service or start charging people for the services it provides, such as 
an annual fee for unlimited access. An alternate method for 
generating revenue would be for Google to take its snippet function 
a step further by allowing consumers to buy Google’s electronically 
scanned books, and, correspondingly, have a compulsory licensing 
scheme that adopts a bookstore model by which authors receive 
revenue. 
A. Taking it one step further - the Bookstore Model 
If a compulsory licensing method is adopted, it is necessary to 
visualize how it would work practically in the real world. Since 
Google is almost acting as a bookstore, the compulsory licensing 
scheme can mimic the concept of a bookstore. Google currently 
allows customers to browse books but the customers cannot directly 
buy these books from Google. This is because Google only has the 
right granted by fair use to use the snippet function. The snippet 
function is the online equivalent to walking into a bookstore and 
reading only parts of a book. This function allows a consumer to get 
a general feel of the book, and extract some information out of the 
book for free, without the added value intrinsic in book purchase. 
If Google’s Library Project functioned like a bookstore, 
everyone would benefit. To create the snippet function, Google has 
already scanned and created entire digital copies of every book. A 
compulsory licensing scheme allows Google to adopt the “high-
risk” option that local bookstores use for local authors. Thus, people 
can read parts of the book for free, and they can buy the book 
directly from Google that are not otherwise available. In turn, 
Google will pay a certain percentage of the book, for example the 
standard 60%, to the author once the book is purchased by a 
consumer. This should not be a difficult system to implement 
because Google already has a system where it sells books on Google 
Play.187 Combining Google Play with the resources of the Google 
                                                 
 187 This paper suggests Google can expand on its pre-existing marketplace to 
sell e-books that it has created that have otherwise not been made available. See 
Margaret Rouse, Google Play (Android Market), SEARCH MOBILE COMPUTING 
(Mar. 4, 2016), http://searchmobilecomputing.techtarget.com/definition/Google-
Play-Android-Market (“Google Play . . . is the official app store for Android 
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Library Project should not burden Google. Google will likely adopt 
this relatively simple solution rather than risk losing all the capital 
it invested in the Library Project. The public will still be able to 
access all the online information from books, Google will benefit, 
and there will be more royalties paid to the authors. 
Furthermore, the settlement suggested that Google was planning 
to use the electronic library of books they created for more than the 
snippet function. The agreement would allow Google to “display 
out-of-print books to users and charge licensing fees for copyrighted 
works. Additionally, the settlement required Google to provide 
portals in every public library and more than 4,000 colleges and 
universities in the U.S., allowing widespread access.”188 Creating a 
compulsory licensing scheme that treats this technology as an 
electronic bookstore will promote efficiency and allow for the 
possibility of these goals to still be fulfilled 
This solution is consistent with fair use as Google is still able to 
provide snippets of the text. However, this proposal allows for 
authors to profit by including a purchasing method. It benefits the 
public because kindle and tablet users may have a preference for a 
digital copy of the text. Perhaps people may need the text 
immediately and cannot wait for it to ship or the book is not at a 
nearby bookstore. Certain books, such as orphan works where the 
rightsholders are indeterminable, may not be available at all. Thus, 
it is almost wasteful to not to allow the use of the Google Library 
Project to function as a bookstore where authors can profit. The 
ultimate goal in Authors Guild v. Google was to allow for a greater 
dissemination of knowledge to the general public. Adopting this 
scheme will satisfy this goal of copyright law. Millions of works 
will be accessed in a way that was never previously possible, while 
allowing for the efficiency and certainty the Google and the Authors 
Guild need to successfully continue on in their respective industries. 
                                                 
Smartphones and tablets. Google makes . . . books available for purchase and 
download through the store.”). 
 188  Authors Guild v. Google, THE AUTHORS GUILD (Jan. 29, 2016), 
https://www.authorsguild.org/where-we-stand/authors-guild-v-google/. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Authors Guild v. Google encompasses fair use issues but suffers 
from the limitations of the doctrine. Although compulsory licensing 
may seem to be a rigid and hands-on approach, it is preferable to fair 
use that currently functions as an on/off switch and does not 
adequately address all issues. Under the confines of fair use, the law 
is not able to adequately able to adapt to certain novel technologies, 
such as digitized books. Thus, Congress should consider 
compulsory licensing, a concept familiar in copyright and 
intellectual property law. By adopting compulsory licensing, 
Congress can ensure that the public receives greater access to 
information online while also ensuring revenue to authors and 
efficiency for Google. 
With the advancement of technology, copyright law cannot stay 
stagnant. The process of selecting and purchasing books is 
becoming digitized. If Google and Amazon are to become the next 
major bookstores, the law should accommodate authors so that they 
can profit as they have in the past. 
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